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Grant Gilreath
Dr. Shefner
University Honors 499

12/28/2007
Governing Global Religions in China
Introduction
As a global studies major politics, history, and religion have all been major
components of my undergraduate coursework. Considering China's status as one of the
few remaining authoritative communist governments left in the world; its long, colorful
history; as well as the presence of both Eastern and Western religions in this country;
China provides a most unique setting for a study of the interaction between government
and religion. The global studies major has instilled in me a very global outlook. My
studies have focused on global trends and phenomena; thus despite the presence of five
official religions in China (Buddhism, Catholicism, Christianity, Daoism, and Islam) and
numerous unofficial, I have chosen to focus my research on the three major global
religions in China: Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam.
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Of course even after narrowing my research to these three global religions,
providing a thorough analysis of their influence from and upon the Chinese government
is still quite daunting. My approach to this task is four-fold and thus my paper is arranged
accordingly:
I first examine the present status of these three religions in China one by one. I
examine the government's policies towards each religion and the impact these policies
have upon the actual practice of the religion itself. My second step is a survey of Chinese
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religious and political history, providing the history of the relationship between religion
and government in China. The third step is an investigation of the recent and current
political factors in China which have a strong relationship with religion and religious
policy.
In the fourth and concluding section of my research I use the perspective gained
from studying Chinese religious and political history as well recent Chinese politics to
explain the current status of these religions. In other words in the concluding section four,
I use the understanding gained from sections two and three to help explain section one.
When choosing this research project aside from seeking a greater understanding of the
current religious situation in China, a major research goal of mine was to discover if there
are any discrepancies in the policies of the Chinese government towards different
religions. Hence, a substantial portion of the concluding section will be dedicated to this
Issue.
Section 1
Introduction

"Citizens of the PRC (People's Republic of China) enjoy freedom of religious
belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe
in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may anyone discriminate against citizens who
believe in, or do not believe in any religion.,,2
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of the Chinese people, guaranteed to
them by their government. Their own constitution clearly lays this out for them in Article
36. Why then is the Chinese government frequently attacked by international human
rights organizations and the u.S. State Department for violations of religious freedom?
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"The state protects nonnal religious activities. No one may make use of religion
to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere
with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and religious affairs are not
subject to any foreign domination.,,3
While guaranteeing the freedom of religion, Article 36 of the Chinese
Constitution places tight restrictions on religious practice at the same time. The freedom
of religion is guaranteed only to "nonnal" religious activities. But what constitutes
nonnal? The constitution fails to spell this out. Thus the government is given complete
freedom in defining nonnal religious activities.
Furthennore, all religious activities must be registered and approved by the
government. Once registered, all religious activities must be administered by officials
who have been approved by the government, conducted at a location approved by the
government, and held at meeting times approved by the government. Any activities
failing to meet these requirements are not protected by law.
In fact, the government's control actually extends into the conduction of religious
services, doctrinal beliefs held and taught, the publication and distribution of materials
for worship and training, and interaction with foreigners. "Political authorities impose
boundaries for acceptable religious doctrines, denouncing beliefs that emphasize
evangelism, supernaturalism, or salvational doctrines that challenge the government's
religious policies or contradict projected symbolic order, which depicts all of Chinese
society as unified under Chinese Communist Party rule.,,4
In practice, the government decides exactly what these restrictions are, as well as
how and when to enforce them. In other words, religion is pennitted in China, but only
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on the government's terms. As demonstrated by their most recent constitution of 1982 the
Chinese government's policy on religion is a paradox, often filled with contradictions and
puzzles. The official and unofficial enforcement of these controls over religion have
differed greatly over time and province to province.
Buddhism
A Traditional Chinese Religion
Whereas Christianity and Islam are both viewed by most Chinese as foreign
religions and in many ways "anti-China" or at least "un-Chinese," Buddhism is viewed
by Chinese people as a traditional Chinese religion. When I first began my research of
religion in China I was often perplexed by this view. Buddhism is clearly not native to
China, as it originated in India and did not enter China until the 1st century A.D. s The
original writings of this religion were transcribed in the Indian language of Sanskrit, a
language very foreign to Chinese. Yet despite these facts, the Chinese still view
Buddhism as being their own. After living in China for more than one year having visited
many Buddhists sights, informally interviewed Buddhists layman and believers, and from
numerous readings I have gained a clear understanding of this view.
The major reason for this view is Buddhism's adoption of Chinese culture and
philosophy after entering China. China's culture and philosophy are distinct and selfcentric, easily and often clashing with foreign cultures and philosophies. Rather than
attempting to impose the local culture and philosophy of origin (in this case India),
Buddhism adjusted itselfto Chinese culture and philosophy. After entering China
Buddhism allowed for the worship of deities from China's numerous local indigenous
religions as well as China's one actual official native religion-Daoism. 6 Aside from
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adopting some of the same deities, Buddhism adopted some of the same religious terms
(often using Daoist terms and concepts to express Buddhist ideas), ceremonies, and
practices as Daoism and local indigenous religions. 7 In fact, today these two religions are
often intermingled and confused with practitioners themselves unable to separate the two.
Another major contributing factor is the compatibility of Buddhism with Chinese
culture and philosophy. A major similarity Buddhism shared with Daoism and native
religions even before entering China was a belief in polytheism. Buddhism calls for the
worship of countless supernatural beings each with their own realm of influence and
ability to answer petitions for certain issues. As Daoism and the vast majority of Chinese
local religions also require the worship of various deities, this is a very strong connection
bridging these religions. Buddhism was able to absorb many ofthese Taoist and local
deities and combine many of them with Buddhist deities. Thus, embracing Buddhism had
great appeal to many Chinese who already believed in Daoism or local religion. Not only
could they keep their own deities and the perceived benefits received from them, but at
the same time gain Buddhist deities and their blessings as well. A mono-theistic religion,
however, would not have such an appeal as it would require a complete separation from
one's former religion and deities.
Aside from a shared belief in polytheism Buddhism and Daoism share a very key
philosophical view. They share the belief that man is not naturally evil and incapable of
good without divine intervention. Rather, they both teach that man is basically good but
often engages in immoral behavior due to desire and other evils. Both of these religions
focus on how man can overcome evil and improve himself through cultivation,
meditation, and the performance of certain rituals and ceremonies. On the other hand
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Christianity and Islam both teach that man is naturally bad and that only through divine
help can he overcome evil.
More similarities can be seen in the actual ordinances and practices of Buddhism,
Daoism, and other local Chinese religions. None of these religions are well organized
with regular scheduled meeting times or well developed communication networks. They
are more personal religions in which the believer makes prayers or burns incense at home
in private, or comes to a temple to make offerings in times of special need or holidays or
participates in a special ceremony performed by laypeople. 8 These religions also involve
the worshipping of idols, burning of incense, and a layman force consisting of monks.
These characteristics are all very similar and in sharp contrast to both Christianity and
Islam.
Due to the aforementioned accommodation of Buddhism to traditional Chinese
culture and philosophy, Buddhism in China has taken on its own form and developed
characteristics different from Buddhism in other locations. This is even more true for the
practice of Buddhism in the area of Tibet. The practice of Buddhism in this region is so
unique that it is labeled as its own separate branch of Buddhism (Tibetan Buddhism) in
contrast to Han Buddhism as practiced in the other areas of China. Tibetan Buddhism
uses its own unique language, worships some separate deities, and is more organized
having a spiritual/ political leader known as the Dalai Lama. As a result of the unique
development of Buddhism in China in which Buddhism has been highly "Sinicized," the
Chinese people have developed the view that Buddhism is their own traditional religion. 9
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Relationship with Government

Of the three religions surveyed, Buddhism is by far given the best treatment by
the Chinese government. As with the other religions in China, Buddhism also is overseen
by the government and organized into a "Patriotic" organization referred to in English as
the Chinese Buddhist Association or CBA. Despite also being supervised by the
government the private nature and lack of regular meetings of the religion prohibits the
government from having a major effect on the daily practice of practitioners. What effect
the government does have on Buddhism in China is largely very positive.
While not officially promoting or endorsing any religions (aside from recognizing
five religions as legal), the Chinese government in practice does just the opposite. The
Chinese government supposedly is a dual structure government with the Communist
Party and government officials working side by side. In reality, however, China is a oneparty government. Most government officials are Communist party members. NonCommunist government officials are typically given symbolic positions with little real
power. Thus, the leaders in the Chinese government with the actual power and influence
are Communist Party members.
One of the requirements for being a Communist party member is denying the
belief in any religion and embracing the atheistic philosophy of Marxism. While never
announced publicly, in practice there seems to be a special exception to this rule made for
those who believe in Buddhism. While party members are not allowed to embrace
Christianity or Islam in any public way, party members who embrace Buddhism are often
left untouched.
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One of the most obvious signs of government endorsement of Buddhism can be
seen by examining government supported tourism in China. Many Buddhists holy sights,
particularly temples and mountains, are major tourist destinations in China. Some of
these sights are financially sponsored by Chinese government agencies. These locations
are not only marketed by government controlled media but also highly funded by the
government. The government assumes responsibility for the maintenance of these sights
as well as construction projects.
This interaction between the government, Buddhism, and tourism has greatly
impacted the Buddhist monastic economy. Before the 1949 takeover by the current
Communist government Buddhist temples and monks were mostly self-supported by
large landholdings. Since that time they have become dependent upon lay donors, the
performance of rituals, government agencies, and gate ticket! tourist revenues. Much of
the funding provided by government agencies is tied to promoting tourism in the region
which in tum provides the government with revenues. Thus, temples are left mostly
relying on rituals fees and tourist revenue for their income. This has led to a great
struggle to retain autonomy and purity in the face of commercialization for Chinese
Buddhists. 10
As a result of being viewed as being a truly traditional Chinese religion, receiving
beneficial treatment from the government, as well as its connection to most of China's
most famous landmarks; Buddhism has become vastly popular in China, claiming more
than 100 million adherents, making it the number one religion in China. However, as
with most religious statistics in China, this estimate is not very reliable. Classifying and
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recognizing Buddhist adherents and laypeople is not a simple task due to the previously
stated private nature of this religion. 11
Governing Tibet

While the relationship between Buddhism and the Chinese government has been
overly positive with Chinese Buddhists receiving many benefits, there is one aspect of
their relationship which is very sensitive for the Chinese government. That issue is the
sovereignty of Tibet. Many adherents of Tibetan Buddhism believe that the Dalai Lama
(who currently leads the exiled Tibetan government from Dharamshala, India) is the
spiritual and political leader of Tibet, and that Tibet should be independent from China.
As the Chinese government is extremely concerned and consumed with maintaining its
territorial borders and regaining control over Taiwan, independent movements in any
form are strongly and swiftly opposed. Thus, the Chinese government has kept a watchful
eye over Tibet and taken measures to maintain control over the region.
The Chinese government has placed special travel restrictions on Tibet allowing
itself to control who has access to this area. All foreigners, especially foreign media, must
obtain a special visa and receive government approval to enter this province. Even after
entering Tibet foreigners are restricted in where they may go and must be accompanied
by Chinese. Another control mechanism employed by the government is population
control. One of the themes of claims for Tibetan independence is their different ethnicity
and language. To combat these claims the government offers economic incentives to
ethnic Han Chinese to move into the province, decreasing the percentage of ethnic and
language minorities in the region. Another method has been through the education system.
As Tibetan children are taught Chinese in school and their admission to university
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dependent upon their master of Chinese as well as some level of proficiency in English,
their native Tibetan language is become less and less useful for them.
Another facet of Chinese government policy on controlling Tibet is maintaining
criticism of the Dalai Lama. The Beijing government frequently criticizes his government
in exile, his supporters, as well as strongly condemns foreign leaders who recognize him
in both domestic and international media channels. He is portrayed as being a threat to
the stability, peace, unity, and development of Tibet and all of China. 12
Aside from criticizing and verbally attacking the Dalai Lama, the Chinese
government has also sought to interfere with the selection process of the Dalai Lama. The
selection process for the Dalai Lama as well as the number two most powerful spiritual!
political Tibetan Buddhism figure the Panchen Lama consists of a search and nomination
phase conducted by a series of esoteric tests then narrowed down with the final selection
coming from the drawing of lots from a golden urn. Traditionally this process is carried
out by several Traditional Tibetan Buddhists senior monks. The Dalai Lama has a major
influence on the selection of the Panchen Lama, and the Panchen Lama also has a major
say in the selection of the Dalai Lama. In 1989 the 10th Panchen Lama died and six years
later the Dalai Lama named a young child as the successor. This boy was soon arrested
by the Chinese government who then appointed its own candidate to the position. In 2007
the Chinese government claimed the right to approve all lama appointments, including
the appointment of the next Dalai Lama. 13
These measures have not all been received passively. Many Tibetans are still very
opposed to the Chinese presence in Tibet and still desire independence. Some Tibetans
still view the Dalai Llama as not only their spiritual leader, but their political leader as
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well. This was clearly demonstrated during the March 2008 protests in Lhasa and other
locations in China. These demonstrations were represented by the Chinese government as
being orchestrated by the Dalai Llama and his supporters in an attempt to gain
international support for their cause in advance of the Beijing Olympics, undermine the
peace and development of Tibet, as well as sully the Olympics. 14
Buddhism has become entrenched in and intertwined with Chinese society and
culture. It claims the largest number of adherents of any religion in China and has an
overly good relationship with the government. Nonetheless, governing Tibetan Buddhism
continues to be a large struggle for the Chinese government, and seems likely to remain
so in the foreseeable future.
Christianity
Introduction

The size ofthe Christian population in China is enormous, 15 17-20 million by
modest Chinese official estimations for churches registered with the government. 16 These
numbers do not include any children under the age of 18, church goers who have not
officially joined the church, or the millions of believers who meet in unregistered house
churches. Outside estimations accounting for unregistered or "house churches" are much
larger, ranging from 60 million to greater than 100 million. Reliable numbers, however,
are impossible to gather, as the vast majority of churches in China are unregistered and
do not keep official membership records. Even official statistics gathered by the Chinese
government are questionable as the government has incentives to manipulate the data and
keep the known number of Christians artificially lower. Nonetheless, China very likely
already possesses the third largest Christian population in the world (when combining
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Catholic and Protestant numbers, China is likely ranked second among Protestant
populations and much lower among Catholics), trailing only the United States and
Brazil. 17
Christianity is rumored to have been first introduced to China by St. Thomas in
the 1st Century AD; however the first authenticated introduction of some form of
Christianity came in the

7th

Century by the Nestorians. Over the next thousand years

various groups of Christians and Catholics entered China, but the number of Chinese
Christians remained very small until the arrival of Protestant missionaries in the early
1800s. The number steadily grew over the next century and continued to grow until the
establishment of the current Communist government in 1949.
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Under Communism
Despite being openly atheistic and banning party members from holding any
religious beliefs, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at first did not openly seek to
abolish religion. It did, however, return to the old model used for centuries by Chinese
dynasties of controlling and monitoring religion. "The new government not only
registered and monitored Protestant and other religious believers, as dynastic regimes had
done, but also systematically reduced the influence of religion in society.,,19
The control apparatus to monitor and control religion was implemented with the
establishment of the Religious Affairs Bureau in 1951. This bureau allowed for five
official religions in China all to be supervised by the government: Buddhism, Taoism,
Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam. Under the Religious Affairs Bureau, organizations
were formed for each religion and labeled as "patriotic" religious organizations. Each
patriotic organization would supervise and monitor its own religion and ensure practice
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was kept within acceptable bounds. Protestant Christianity was to be monitored by the
Protestant Three Self Movement (TSPM) whose main purpose was to several all relations
Western missions.
Not only did these organizations regulate religious activity actively, but they also
aggressively sought to destroy the autonomy and reduce the influence of religious groups
and communities. In fact, this government exceeded control levels over religion
demonstrated by most pre- 1949 ruling regimes. During Mao's Cultural Revolution,
which began in 1966, all churches, temples, monasteries, and venues for any kind of
religious activity were closed for more than a decade. Religion was officially and
effectively abolished, surpassing anything attempted by the monitoring devices of
dynastic or republican regimes in the pre-Communist era. Left with no practical purpose,
organizations such as the Religious Affairs Bureau and the patriotic religious
..
organIzatIOns
were ab 0 1·IS hed .20
With Mao's death in 1976 the Cultural Revolution came to an end, ushering in the
reformist era which soon began with the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. Under Deng's
leadership Maoist controls were loosened as the state backed away from a radical stance
of eliminating religion and returned to the more historically familiar policy of registration
and monitoring. Official religious life was resumed with the resurrection of both the
Religious Affairs Bureau and the patriotic religious organizations. Due to its active role
in the radical Mao-era political campaigns, the TSPM lost much of its legitimacy. As a
result, an additional Protestant organization, the China Christian Council, was created to
work alongside the TSPM, to handle church management and ecclesiastical affairs. The
Religious Affairs Bureau and the officially authorized religious organizations continue
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today to constitute what are in many ways the equivalent of the old imperial devices of
monitoring and control that existed for centuries.
After the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, Christianity in China has witnessed
rapid growth. In 1976 at the end of the Cultural Revolution there were no open churches
in China. In 2006 there were 50,000 government-registered Protestant churches and
meeting points. This growth in the registered Three-Self Government operated churches
alone is astounding; yet, it has been vastly overshadowed by the proliferation of
unregistered house churches.
Home-Grown Christians

The fundamentalist doctrine endorsed by the majority of Chinese Christians
teaches separation between the church and state, headship of the Church by Christ alone
(in other words accountability to God rather than government or man), emphasizes
salvation by grace through faith in Christ, focuses on Biblical prophecy, the supernatural,
the deity of Jesus Christ, militant evangelism, indoctrination of children, and the
appointment of church leadership according to spiritual qualifications and abilities. All of
these teachings are in direct conflict with government regulations on religion. Thus most
beliefs held by the majority of Chinese Christians are incompatible with the doctrines of
the government operated Three-Self churches.
Mainstream TSPM churches are ran and headed by the government, require
political study for church leaders, teach a liberal theology, discourage personal
evangelism, prohibit the indoctrination of children, place restrictions on topics for
preaching and teaching, and appoint church leadership that is supportive of and
submissive to the Communist Party. These conflicts coupled with the leadership of the
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TSPM and the Religious Affairs Bureau being Communist Party supporters, many of
them party members and ardent atheists, has led to a strong distrust of TSPM churches
among informed and educated Chinese Christians?l This distrust has helped fuel the
rapid spread of unofficial house churches.
Christian Phobia
In sharp contrast to the positively-viewed "traditional" religion of Buddhism,
Christianity is perhaps the most negatively viewed religion by the Chinese government.
Despite its presence for more than 1,000 years in China, Christianity continues to be seen
as a foreign religion and struggles to escape an association with Western imperialism.
The reasons for this association will be explored in section two of this paper. The
relationship between Christianity and the Chinese government is most antagonistic and
the largest source of international criticism of Chinese government human right abuses.
Also in contrast to Buddhism, Christianity is a highly organized religion in which
believers are organized into a local church which has weekly meetings, a hierarchy of
leadership, and most importantly a strong philosophy which commands loyalty and often
has political implications.
This philosophy promoted by Christianity covers every aspect of life and the
political process, providing adherents with strong views on every issue (from abortion
rights, homosexual marriage, the death penalty, to the economy, welfare, and even war).
Thus, many Christians are very active in politics and have a large influence on the
political affairs of their respective nation. As Christianity was introduced to China mostly
by Western missionaries, the Chinese continue to associate this religion with the West,
despite its actual origins in the Middle East. Observing the political process in Western
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democracies has greatly fueled the Chinese government's fears of Christianity. Christian
groups are political juggernauts in the u.s. and many European democracies, exerting
immense political power. The entire goal of the Chinese government's religious policy is
to maintain a monopoly over political power and keep all opposition at bay. Thus, the
political power of Christian groups that is demonstrated in western countries greatly
contributes to the CCP's fears of Christianity.
Further fueling such fears was Christianity's active role in bringing about the
collapse of Eastern Europe's communist governments. Catholicism was at the heart of the
Polish Solidarity Movement which overthrew their communist government, and church
groups played a key role in East Germany's "revolution ofthe candles," which
overturned their atheistic communist government. 22 Religion already has a well
established connection with rebellion and separatist movements in both current-day
~.

China (as the previously mentioned Tibet situation and to be mentioned later with Islamic
separatist movements in Xinjiang) and historical China as well (to be explored in section
two). Modem cases of political rebellion in other countries fueled by Christianity only
reinforce the communist party's already established fears of Christianity in China.
Perhaps the biggest issue involved is one of loyalty. In order to maintain its power
the communist party must command the complete loyalty of its people. With registered
and unregistered church member estimates combined reaching around 80 million; the
number of Christians in China is possibly greater than the number of Chinese Communist
Party members (over 73 million).23 The potential political power of such a large number
of Chinese Christians, with an ever increasing growth rate, is very threatening to the
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Communist Party. This has led the Chinese Government to use extra controls over
Christianity, particularly over the aforementioned unregistered "house churches".
Tools of Control and Repression

In the Three-self churches government regulations touch on virtually every aspect
of religious life, including sermon contents, prohibitions against providing religious
instruction to children under the age of eighteen or endorsing followers to listen to
overseas religious broadcasts, the qualifications and duties of clergy, and even the
conduction of religious services. In addition, the government requires a "threedesignates" policy: a fixed location for worship, a permanent responsible leader, and
activities restricted to a given geographic area. Regulations prohibit religious activities
from hindering production, endangering the social order, or "affecting the work, studies,
and life ofresident.,,24 Such ambiguous and vague prohibitions allow political authorities
to monitor and persecute religious activities as they deem fit.
The Religions Affairs Bureau not only must approve meet times and locations,
but even chooses leadership in the church and the content of their sermons. As these
churches are operated by the government, accordingly their budgets are funded by the
government as well, giving the government even more control over church workers. The
government, not Christian congregations, has complete power in appointing church
officials and administrators. In some cases even non-Christian party-loyalists are
appointed as ministers in spite of protests from the church membership.25
Thus, as mentioned previously, many Christian groups choose to have
unregistered meetings to avoid such regulations. To avoid government detection
gatherings are often very small and held in the home of one of the believers (thus the
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name "house churches") or a home rented specifically for the purpose of hosting
.

meetmgs.

26

The degree of freedom exhibited by these unregistered house churches differs
greatly province to province and locality to locality. House churches are generally
permitted to operate so long as they keep their numbers low (typically anywhere from 2050 depending on the location) and stay out of the public's attention. In most areas of
China even if detected by the local government, abiding by these two principles keeps the
meetings from being interrupted. In more politically sensitive areas such as Beijing and
Shanghai this is not always the case, as any unregistered Christian meetings may face

harsh retn·b·
utlOn. 27
Workers in Three-Self churches who do not comply with the government and
house church members who attract the attention of the government may be exposed to
various degree of punishment. Some simply face verbal reprimands from the local police
or government officials and often verbal threats if their actions continue. Often, however,
the reprisals are much more severe involving physical harassment, damage to personal
property, fines, detention, labour re-education, or even criminal proceedings and
indefinite imprisonments. 28
An additional tool of the Chinese government to control Christianity is the

banning of foreign printed Christian material as well as foreign produced audio-visual
Christian material. As the Bureau for Religious Affairs controls what religious material is
made in China and foreign materials are all banned, this gives the government complete
control over what information is disseminated about Christianity. As a global religion
which places an emphasis on evangelism, Christians heavily rely on written material and,
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in recent years, audio-visual material to spread their message. Having control over this
material is a very powerful tool for the Chinese government.
A final control mechanism worth mentioning is the limitations placed on
interacting with foreign Christians. The only influential Christian education system in
th

China's history was established by Protestant missionaries in the 19 Century. These
Christian schools were all closed down or converted into regular schools after the
Communist takeover. Since then the government has opened a few Christian Universities,
but with very limited enrollment. Considering these circumstances, combined with the
ban on foreign printed Christian material, there is a large lack of Christian education in
China. Thus, not only many Chinese Christian congregants, but even church leaders are
untrained, uneducated, and even ignorant of basic Christian doctrines.
Foreign Christians and Christian organizations based in countries without such
restrictions are capable of traveling to China and training Chinese Christians and assisting
in the development of a Christian education. Financially powerful foreign Christian
organizations are also capable and willing to providing funding to Chinese Christians.
Nevertheless, the Chinese government restricts foreign financial support for Chinese
churches as it stresses self-support and bans foreigners from leading and even preaching
at Chinese religious services (with the exception being made for foreigners having an
invitation to do so by a provincial or national level religious body)?9
Despite a very negative history and a continuing struggle to escape a label as
being a Western tool of imperialism, Christianity in China is large and ever growing. The
relationship between Christianity and the Chinese Government is exceptionally negative.
The Chinese Government greatly fears Christianity and has repressed and sought to
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control Christianity more so than any other religion. Nonetheless, Christianity in China
continues to grow and thrive, especially in the form of unregistered "house churches."
Islam

An Ethnic Religion
Whereas Buddhism is viewed by most Chinese people as a traditional Chinese
religion and Christianity is viewed as being an imperialistic foreign religion, Islam is in a
category of its own. In China Islam is mostly confined to a geographical region of China,
the northwestern province of Xinjiang, and to ethnic minority groups. Thus, most
Chinese do not necessarily view Islam as a foreign religion, but as being a religion for
ethnic minorities.
Islam first entered China in the 7th century with Arabic traders traveling along the
Silk Road. Over the next several centuries trade between the Tang and Song Dynasties
with Persia and other Arabic countries continuously expanded, both along the Silk Road
and by sea as well. This trade brought many Arabic and Persian merchants to China,
some ofthem settling permanently. Their goals for settling in China were mostly
restricted to commercial interests rather than proselytization, thus Islam spread very
slowly at this time, with the only growth coming through birth and intermarriage with
Chinese women. It was not until the arrival of Genghis Khan and the establishment of the
Yuan or Mongolian Dynasty in China that Islam really spread in China. 3o
The vast empire conquered by Genghis Khan and his descendants spanned nearly
all of Asia, including many Arabic, Persian, and Central Asian lands which are mostly
populated by Muslims. Many of these Arabic, Persian, and Central Asian Muslims joined
the Mongolian army as soldiers or craftsman and participated in campaigns in China.
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After these campaigns many of them settled in China, particularly in western regions. In
fact, many population migrations took place during the rule of this dynasty, bringing
large populations of people from Central Asia into what today is considered mainland
China. 3l
The Yuan dynasty rulers adopted a policy of tolerance towards all religions, and
some even embraced Islam as their own religion. The social position of Muslims was
greatly elevated as Muslims were treated as the second highest class in the Yuan Dynasty
(behind native Mongolians and outranking the Han Chinese). Their political and
economic statuses were both elevated at this time as well as they were given priority
government positions and favorable taxes from the government. This influx of Muslim
migrants coupled with the policy of religious tolerance and even privilege contributed
greatly to the spread and development of Islam in China. 32
The Yuan Dynasty was replaced by the Ming Dynasty in the 14th Century. The
Ming Dynasty was not as kind to Muslims as the Yuan Dynasty had been, and many of
the gains made by Islam during the Yuan Dynasty were lost. The political, social, and
economic privileges previously awarded to Muslims were all removed, and the Ming
dynasty adopted a policy that would shape the future of Islam in China: national
assimilation and racial intermarriage restrictions. 33
Up until the Ming Dynasty, Muslims were still greatly scattered all throughout
China. They were living in very small concentrations dispersed all over the Chinese
population. Ming Dynasty national assimilation policies brought the dispersed Muslims
and other minority groups together to form new communities with similar features,
values, and customs. The formation of these communities led to an intermingling of races,
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languages, and cultures which eventually developed into several new Islam-embracing
ethnic minority groups. Ten of these Islam-embracing minority ethnic groups are
officially recognized by China today: Uighurs, Huis, Tatars, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Khalkas,

Kazaks, Salas, Bao' ans, and Dongxiangs. These groups mostly settled in the Western
regions of China: Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Yunnan, and especially Xinjiang.
Considerable Muslim populations can also be found in Henan, Hebei, Shaanxi, and
Shandong. 34
Today the population of these ten ethnic groups numbers over 20 million; yet, the
estimation for the number of Chinese Muslims is the same as few Chinese people outside
of these ethnic groups embrace Islam. While Islam is often sighted as the fasting growing
religion in the world, this growth comes from birth and intermarriage rather than from
proselytization and conversion. The growth of Islam in China has followed this trend
closely.35 Thus, Islam in China has become strongly associated with ethnicity and
heritage.
Accommodations

As with Buddhism, the linguistic, cultural, and philosophical background of Islam
are all quite different from the ancient traditions of China derived from Confucianism and
Daoism. With Islam, however, the differences are more severely pronounced. Thus, in
order to maintain an existence in China Islam has made numerous accommodations
throughout its history in China.
Throughout its existence in China Islam encountered many hindrances and found
itself in many ways incompatible with the Chinese. Of course a major issue initially was
the foreign concepts and philosophies of this religion. As previously mentioned the local
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religions of China as well as Buddhism are all pluralistic religions, whereas Islam is
monotheistic. Language was also a very key issue. Not only are the scriptures of Islam-the Koran-- written in Arabic, but Arabic is elevated as a holy language in the religion of
Islam, even non-Arabic speakers are required to conduct prayers in Arabic. Naturally,
such a requirement held little appeal to non-native Arabic speakers.
Later the issues compounded as the family-based Islamic Education System
became inadequate, and Islam faced a growing challenge from the revitalization of
traditional Chinese culture and Confucian philosophy as well as the resurrection of
Daoism and Buddhism. These obstacles pressured Chinese Muslims to seek changes.
To cope with the language problem a Chinese translation of the Koran was
accomplished during the Ming Dynasty. At this time the Chinese Muslim leaders also
revolutionized their education system by developing an organized, systematic, mosquebased education system. To meet the challenges from traditional Chinese culture and
Confucian philosophy Islam adapted itself. Chinese Muslim scholars familiarized
themselves with Confucianism, borrowed some thoughts and philosophies from both
Confucianism and Buddhism, found ways to use Confucian thought to justify Islam, to
show the compatibilities between Muslim thought and Confucian thought as well as to
criticize Confucianism. Muslim scholars also used their knowledge of Confucianism to
debate with Buddhists and Taoists. In a further act of accommodation, Chinese Muslims
adjusted their holidays and calendars to make them more compatible with Chinese
holidays.36
These adjustments strengthened the position of Islam and assisted in the
assimilation of this religion to China. Yet, it is the philosophical differences between
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Islam and traditional Chinese philosophy that presented and continues to present one of
the largest problems. As with Christianity Islam is often a very political religion.
Buddhism focuses on the moral conduct and self-improvement of the individual, but has
little concern for politics, economics, and social issues. The doctrines and philosophies of
Islam, on the other hand, have many social, economic, and political implications for its
followers. Islam even has a comprehensive code or set of laws covering every aspect of
life derived from the Koran known as Shari'ah. In fact, most states with majority Muslim
populations adopt Shari'ah as their national law, making Islam the official state religion.
Thus, Islam creates a very strong identity for its adherents, and Chinese Muslims are no
exception. Indeed, identity for Chinese Muslims is even more pronounced for multiple
reasons and has several significant political implications.
Identity and Independence

In China Muslims have an identity very distinct from other Chinese. As
previously stated the overwhelming majority of Chinese Muslims are not Han Chinese
who constitute 92% of the Chinese population, but rather ethnic minorities. 37 These
minorities have their own languages (most being Turkic dialects), customs, holidays, and
physical characteristics all separate from other Chinese. A second factor distinguishing
them from the majority of the Chinese population is obviously their religion. This factor
is quite significant when considering the previously discussed social, economic, and
political implications of Islamic philosophy. The third major factor of the Chinese
Muslim identity is geography.
More than 10 million of China's 20 million Muslims are concentrated in Xinjiang
province which shares a border with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirghiziastan, Tajikistan,

25
Pakistan, Mongolia, India, and Afghanistan. This province has historically been inhabited
by non-Han Chinese populations. In fact, in 1949 when the Communists took over China
and occupied Xinjiang 90% of the population was ethnic Uighur, with only 5% of the
population being ethnically Han Chinese.

38

This area also has a history of independence, however concise it may be. During
the mid-eighteenth century the Uighurs established their own kingdom in this region
which nearly lasted a century. Also, before the Communists came to power in 1949,
Uighur nationalists twice seceded from China and established an independent nation
called the Eastern Turkestan Republic, from 1931 to 1934 and from 1944 to 1949.39
As a result of such a distinct and well-defined identity with ethnic, language,
cultural, social, religious, and even geographical and historical ties, many Muslims,
especially Uighur in the Xinjiang area, have developed a desire for independence, or at
least greater autonomy.
After the official annexation of Xinjiang by Communist China in 1955 Uighur
groups formed separatists movements and sought for independence from Beijing. Some
of these movements have been peaceful; others have turned violent through bombings,
riots, and political assignations. The use of violence and protest became increasingly
rampant during the 1990s. During this decade more than two thousand acts of recorded
violence occurred in Xinjiang province alone. 40 The largest and most famous separatist
organization is the ETIM, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. Thus, Beijing has found
governing Islam, and especially Xinjiang to be no easy task.
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Governing Islam
As with Buddhism and Christianity, Islam also is overseen by the government and
organized into a "Patriotic" organization referred to in English as the Chinese Islamic

Association. Mosques are under the government's authority and mosque leaders known
as imam-hatybs are appointed by the state. Islamic literature is strictly controlled and
Muslim children are especially targeted for government controls. As previously
mentioned Islam is mostly spread biologically through marriage and birth rather than
through conversion. Accordingly, a key to preventing or at least slowing the growth of
Islam is to inhibit the transfer of this religion from parent to child. This appears to be the
thought of the Chinese government as reflected in several of their policies.
The Chinese government strictly enforces its prohibition on the religious
education of children under the age of 18 towards Muslims. Anyone under the age of 18
is banned from entering a mosque. Muslim girls are prevented from wearing a hijab (a
traditional scarf worn by Muslim women that leaves only the face uncovered) to school,
and Muslim students are prevented by their schools from fasting during the month of
Ramadan (in which all Muslims are required to fast during the daytime everyday for the
entire month).41 Government controls are especially tight in Xinjiang Province.
The heavy concentration of Muslims in this area coupled with the presence of
separatist movements has led the Chinese government to enact even greater and more
extensive control mechanisms in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. As with Tibet,
but perhaps to an even greater extent here, the Chinese government has strongly
promoted the migration of Han Chinese into this region. The government-promoted
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migration of Han Chinese into these Western regions of China is one part of the "Great
Western Development Program."
The disparity between China's highly developed and heavily populated eastern
coastal regions and under-populated and under-developed western areas is striking. The
six provinces, five autonomous regions, and one municipality targeted by this project
contain over 70% of China's area, yet only account for less than 30% of China's
popUlation and less than 20% of China's total economic output. The central government
views the underdevelopment of the west, particularly Xinjiang and Tibet as great
contributors to the unrest and desire for independence in these two provinces. Developing
these regions is key to promoting stability. Thus, in 2000 the "Great Western
Development Program" was initiated to this issue.
This development program has entailed massive Central Government investment
increases, infrastructure projects, efforts on ecological protection, promotion of education,
and a wide-range of favorable economic policies. Another aspect of this project is human
resource development. Accompanying the economic growth created by this project is a
need for qualified personnel, especially in science, technology, and management fields.
As Xinjiang is lacking in such human resources, the Chinese government has enacted
several policies to attract Han Chinese from the eastern regions of China to come to
Xinjiang. High wages, housing, waived residency requirements, and various other perks
have all been offered to qualified Han Chinese who will relocate to this area. Coastal
populations, particularly universities, have been targeted by recruitment campaigns to
participate in this program. 42
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This program has already brought noticeable economic gains to the region as well
as a large influx of migrants from China's eastern regions. As previously stated in 1949
when the Communists took over China and occupied Xinjiang 90% of the population was
ethnic Uighur, with only 5% of the population being ethnically Han Chinese. Today, Han
Chinese account for nearly 40% of the population, revealing large Han population
migrations the past half century, particularly this past decade.
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The "Great Western Development Project" has brought many economic gains to
China's western regions. Xinjiang in particular has greatly benefited from this boom and
rapidly boosted living standards. The local population, however, claims few of the gains
have benefited the Muslim population, but rather have benefited the Han immigrants.
This in tum has led to even greater ethnic tensions between the groups. Also, the influx of
non-Uighur language speaking Han Chinese has created conflicts over language, as local
Uighurs expect the Han Chinese to speak their own Turkic-based language, and the Han
Chinese expect the Uighur to speak Mandarin. The Uighurs feel especially threatened as
Mandarin is given a clear preference over their native tongue by the education system as
well as the job market. Intermarriage between Uighurs and Han Chinese is very rare, and
the two ethnicities remain highly segregated.
Just as with Tibet the central government has placed tight controls over media in
Xinjiang. Reports on Xinjiang by Chinese are carefully filtered and monitored, while
reports by foreign reporters are even more strictly scrutinized and require government
approval. In fact, the government even restricts foreign media access to the region as
foreign media representatives are required to obtain permission before entering Xinjiang.
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A crucial aspect of governing Xinjiang for the Chinese government is eliminating
Islamic separatist groups. These groups are viewed by the government as the greatest
threat to stability in the region. As mentioned earlier, separatist groups such as the ETIM,
the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, have been advocating for Xinjiang independence
ever since the annexation of Xinjiang in 1955. The last two decades have brought a rise
in the activities of these groups. This increase is likely a response to the aforementioned
increased ethnic tensions caused by recent government policies as well as the formation
of several Turkic states in Central Asia. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the
creation of several Turkic states in Central Asia (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), providing secessionists in Xinjiang with great hope of
independence for themselves.
Groups such as the ETIM have sought independence through protests and
petitions; developed extensive international networks (especially online), lobbied
international bodies to support their cause, and in some cases turned to violence through
bombings and political assassinations. The Chinese government's response to these
groups has been one of zero-tolerance. Any form of dissent or unregistered political
activity in the region has been harshly and systematically suppressed through arrest and
imprisonment. Large security forces have been placed in this region and capital
punishment is frequently and speedily employed to deal with dissidents. In fact,
according to amnesty international Xinjiang province averages 1.8 executions per week,
one of the highest execution rates in the world.
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On the Sunny Side

While the Chinese government does govern Muslims and especially the province
of Xinjiang with a tight hand, there are certainly some positive sides to this relationship
as well. As previously mentioned, in recent years the Chinese government has invested a
lot of money in its Western provinces, especially Xinjiang. As a result, this province has
developed rapidly during the past two decades. While the influx of Han Chinese into the
region; the conduction of university entrance exams in Mandarin; as well as the
Mandarin-speaking requirement of all decent jobs have all diminished the importance of
the Uighur and other Muslim minority group languages, the Chinese government has
allowed for and even supported the continuance of ethnic language instruction.
The Chinese government has also respected the strict dietary restrictions of
Muslims as the Chinese military and public schools have accommodated soldiers and
students with Muslim dining facilities. Universities and government agencies have
enacted affirmative action policies reserving positions and lowering requirements for
ethnic Muslims. According to the Chinese government ethnic Muslims have also been
given partial exceptions from the one-child policy. These claims, however, have been
strongly countered by many Uighur Muslims who claim that not only has the one-child
policy been applied to them, but it has been applied with brutal force, including coercive
birth control and forced sterilizations. 44
Islam has a long history in China and a strong connection to ethnicity and identity.
Its association with independence movements in the province of Xinjiang has led to a
negative relationship with the Chinese government and the establishment of very strong
controls over this religion. The importance of Chinese Muslims and the province of
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Xinjiang to China both politically and economically creates a very complex and intricate
relationship between this religion and government.
Section 2
History of Religion in China
Religion and Rebellion

Understanding the history of religion in China is a prerequisite to understanding
the current state of affairs. Throughout the history of China religion has been linked with
unrest and revolt, giving religion very negative political overtones. Thus, the history of
religion in China has been accompanied by constant attempts by the government to
control and marginalize it.
Historically, the Chinese political and social order has been based on the
"mandate ofheaven.,,45 Under this order, the ruler has complete power and demands
complete loyalty from the people. There is no room under such a system for any other
groups in society to offer salvation or command absolute loyalty. Thus, as popular
religions in China have gained influence they have been met with strong opposition from
the governing rulers. This has been demonstrated time and time again in Chinese history
by various control mechanisms over religion, official crackdowns on religion, and
attempts to remove religious groups. There has hardly been a Chinese political regime
from the Tang dynasty (618-907 A.D.) to the present that has not required a form of
registration or licensing of religious groups or has not assumed the right to monitor and
intervene in religious affairs. All groups outside the properly registered groups have
frequently undergone official harassment and persecution. Persecution, in tum, has led to
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popular uprisings. This relationship has "endowed China with an unparalled history of
religious-based political rebellion.,,46
A Rocky Start
The first major religious-based political rebellions in China occurred during the
Han Dynasty in 184 AD. At this time two rebellions broke-out simultaneously: the
Yellow Turban rebellion and the Five Pecks of Grain rebellion. The Yellow Turban
rebellion broke out along the lower Yangtze River in Eastern China and the Five Pecks of
Grain rebellion began in Sichuan Province. These rebellions can both be labeled as Taoist
as they drew their inspiration from Taoist priests who stirred up impoverished peasants
and aroused violent attacks against government officials who they blamed for their
misery. These rebellions both led to great losses of life, but were eventually subdued and
replaced by other movements. 47
In 751 A.D. Muslim armies defeated Chinese armies in Central Asia, gained
control ofthe Silk Road, and threatened the Tang Dynasty. This provocation led to a
disdain for all foreign religions and eventually an imperial decree against any religion
considered "foreign. ,,48
The next major religious rebellion occurred during the Song Dynasty from 11201121. This rebellion was known as the Fang La or Fang Xi rebellion, and occurred in the
southeastern provinces of Fujian, Zhejiang, and Anhui. This rebellion was created by
tensions over government taxes and had connections to the Gnostic religion of
Manichaeism (which entered China in the eighth century by Uighur merchants), some
elements of Taoism and Buddhism, as well as sorcery and magic. 49 This rebellion forced
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the Song government to dispatch more than 150,000 soldiers and led to a death total of
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The following dynasty known as the Yuan or Mongolian Dynasty was overthrown
by the Buddhist Red Turban Rebellion in the mid-fourteenth century. Hostility towards
their Mongol conquerors combined with the anticipated coming of the future Buddha and
establishment ofa "pure land" (as taught by the Maitreya cult of the White Lotus
Buddhist sect) inspired the Han Chinese to instigate this rebellion. The widely held antiMongol sentiments of the time allowed this rebellion to obtain adequate support and form
a revolution which was successful in ousting the Mongols and founding the Ming
Dynasty. 51
The White Lotus Buddhist sect continued to inspire rebellions in China in the late
eighteenth century. In 1774 Wang Lun who claimed to be the reincarnation ofthe
Maitreya Buddha and the rightful Chinese Emperor led an armed rebellion in China's
eastern Shandong province. The rebellion was soon pacified, but only to see an even
larger White Lotus Buddhist inspired rebellion transpire twenty years later in central
China. This rebellion escalated for several years, gave the Qing military its first real
challenge, and was not suppressed until 1804. 52
Fresh Memories

The 1800s and early part of the 1900s in China were characterized by western
imperialism and large-scale domestic rebellions which were instrumental in shaping the
present-day China. The early 1800s brought many Europeans to China in the form of
traders, missionaries, and even opium smugglers. As trading balance between China and
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Britain began to tilt significantly in China's favor, Britain encouraged the opium trade,
despite strong opposition from the Qing government.
This conflict eventually led to the first Opium War in 1839, which resulted in
China's defeat and the signing of the Treaty on Nanjing in 1842. This was the first of
several treaties which the Chinese would be forced to sign with foreign nations over the
next half-century later to become labeled as the "Unequal Treaties." These treaties
followed humiliating military defeats and forced the Chinese government to pay large
amounts of war reparations; open up ports and cities for trade, travel, and missionary
activity; lease or cede territories; and provide special privileges to foreigners living in
China.
Under these treaties Christianity gained a position of special privilege in China.
Christianity could no longer be monitored by the Chinese government, missionaries were
allowed to operate freely in China, and they were placed under the jurisdiction of their
respective governments and exempted from the authority of the Chinese imperial
government. As these treaties were imposed by Western countries through military power
they were seen as the result of Western imperialism, and Christianity too, became
associated with Western imperialism. 53
One result of such privilege was one of the most devastating revolts in history, the
Taiping Rebellion from 1850-1864. A failed government official examinee, Hong
Xiuquan, received a Christian gospel tract and somehow convinced himself that he was
the younger brother of Jesus. He gained a following and founded the "Society of GodWorshippers" in southern China with its capital in Nanjing. After government repression,
Hong launched a political rebellion to overthrow the Qing Dynasty which resulted in his
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defeat, but only after the death of some 20 million Chinese. While the Taipings were not
orthodox Christians by any means, their association with Christianity in the minds of the
Chinese was very strong. This affair confirmed all the past experiences of the ruling
dynasties with religious movements resulting in unrest, subversion, and rebellion. The
image of Chinese Christians as being disloyal and rebellious and of foreign missionaries
as promoting subversion was etched into the minds of the Chinese rulers and remains
fresh today. 54
As the Taiping Rebellion was engrossing southern and central China, at the same
time two major Muslim rebellions developed in western China. In 1856 the Panthay
Rebellion broke-out in the southwestern province of Yunnan. The unfavorable
discrimination to which the Muslim population of this region was subjected to by the Han
Chinese and the ruling Manchu was the main cause of this rebellion. The Muslims held a
majority of the population in this area at the time and were able to subdue the city of Dali
in Yunnan and briefly establish an independent state. When this rebellion was finally
vanquished in 1873, it had left a death total of more than 1 million in the province. 55
Meanwhile, in 1862 rebellion also broke-out in Northwest China in the provinces
of Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. In these regions a new mystic and radical form
of Islam became popular which brought the Hui minority group into conflict with other
Muslims and with the Han Chinese. This rebellion is referred to in many different terms
some of which are the "Hui Minorities' War", the "Dungan Rebellion," and the "Muslim
Rebellion." Taiping troop encroachments towards this region provoked the formation of
both Han and Hui armies. This militarization motivated the Hui Muslims to seek to form
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their own separate nation in Northwestern China. This conflict dragged on for years,
leading to the death of more than 2 million before finally coming to an end in 1877. 56
From 1899-1901 the most recent major religious rebellion occurred, known as the
Boxer Rebellion. This uprising was led by members of the Society of Right and
Harmonious Fists, also referred to as the Spirit Boxers, against foreign influence in
China. This group was a descendent of the White Lotus Buddhist sect which was linked
to numerous rebellions in Chinese history. This group, however, rather than focusing on a
millenarian return of the Maitreya Buddha, instead focused on simple ethical principles,
practicing the physical exercise of boxing, as well as spiritual possession and healing.
The movement eventually became aimed at opposing foreigners, imperialism, and
Christianity and became increasingly hostile and even violent towards Christians. The
movement first gained power in the eastern province of Shandong and ultimately made
its way to Beijing. More than two hundred foreign diplomats, missionaries, and other
foreigners, thousands of Chinese Christian converts, and an unknown number of rebels
and their sympathizers were killed during this siege on Beijing. Thousands more were
killed in other parts of China. 57
As a response to the attack on the foreign legations in Beijing, eight foreign
nations-Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, Great Britain, and the
United States-formed an alliance and sent troops to relieve the siege in Beijing. The
eight nation alliance succeeded in quelling the rebellion, and then went on to punish the
Qing government with over $300 million USD in war reparations, and execute more than
50,000 Chinese civilians suspected of being involved in the Boxer movement.
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The history of religion in China reveals much of the reason for the distrust of
religion by today's government, the disdain for foreign missionaries, and explains the
perceived need to control and monitor religion, and the fear of religious rebellion. The
th

th

events in the late Qing Period (19 and early 20 centuries) gained Christianity a
particularly bad reputation in China as stated rather candidly by Ryan Dunch in his
account of Protestantism in Fuzhou:
"Christian preachers and converts were routinely vilified in the official discourse
of the late Qing. Chinese officials, publicly at least, portrayed Christian converts
as lowlifes and vagabonds who converted for personal gain, fomented trouble in
local society, and tried to use their anomalous status under the treaties to impose
upon decent people. ,,59

During the Nationalistic period which followed the collapse of the Qing and
preceded the founding of the current Communist state the attitude toward Christians and
especially foreign missionaries was still rather bitter. One Nationalist writer expressed the
prevailing attitude of the period when he wrote: "Christian missionaries have been
described as the cultural arm of Western imperialism and stand accused of having
denationalized many Chinese converts and having disintegrated both the body and spirit
of the nation.,,6o
China's turbulent history with religion has been especially emphasized by the
current Communist regime. Today's history books, educational resources and programs,
and government rhetoric all call attention to religion'S association with rebellion in
Chinese history as well as religion'S ties to foreigners, especially foreign imperialism.
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This negative history has been used by the Communist regime to justify the need to
control and monitor religion in China.
Section 3

Relevant Political Factors
As demonstrated in section 2, China has a long history of religious rebellion
which provides the modern Chinese government with a fear and distrust of religion. This
historical relationship has been used by this government as a validation for controlling
and monitoring religion. In addition to the very relevant historical factors, there are
several present-day political factors which help provide an explanation for the current
Chinese government's belief in a need for controlling and monitoring religion.
Political Monopoly

The first major factor is the political monopoly achieved by the Chinese
Communist Government and their desire to maintain this monopoly. The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) rules the administration, judiciary, legislature, media, military,
and police, giving the CCP thus has a complete monopoly over all political and social
control mechanisms. There are no legal rivals or challenges to its leadership as the select
few and insignificant non-communist political parties are merely satellites who may offer
advice but have no share of ruling power. One ofthe only real potential rivals to the CCP
is organized religion, which can compete with the party over ideological, organizational,
and economic resources. The question remaining is why the CCP has chosen to control
and monitor this potential rival of religion rather than completely wipe it out. The answer
is two-fold.
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Firstly, religion has proven over time to be all but impossible to complete wipeout. Organized religion in China has survived centuries of repression and monitoring by
imperial dynasties and even survived the all-out frontal attack from the current regime
during Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution. These experiences show to the CCP that an
effort to completely remove religion would not be easy, and would require an immense
amount of resources unlikely to compensate any perceived benefits of eliminating a
potential rival.
Secondly, the ideology of Marxism leaves Chinese citizens with a spiritual and
social vacuum. This ideology offers no explanation for those issues left unexplained by
science, particularly issues regarding the afterlife. Marxism also fails to set out any moral
code or standard of ethics. Furthermore, Marxism fails to provide citizens with a nonpolitical sphere of social goods and services. Organized religions on the other hand,
provide for all of these shortcomings of Marxism. Thus, allowing for the existence of
organized religious groups helps compensate for some of the shortfalls of Marxism and
meet the needs of the people. Meanwhile, closely controlling and monitoring organized
religion allows the CCP to keep the influence and power of this potential rival in check,
while at the same time providing the benefits of religion to its citizens and avoiding the
costs required of directly attacking religion.
Territory
Perhaps the most relevant factor in recent years has been the desire of the Chinese
Government to defend its territorial sovereignty. Recurrent references are made in official
government rhetoric to defending territorial sovereignty. These references are most
frequently made in regards to Taiwan and Tibet. The Chinese Government still views
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Taiwan as an inalienable part of China, currently considered as a renegade province
which needs to be restored to its proper place. Restoring Taiwan to the mainland is a top
priority for the CCP, and has become the defining issue of patriotism for most Chinese
people. The recent takeovers of Hong Kong (1997) and Macau (1999) and the one
country two systems policy implemented in those regions were all a model for the
anticipated restoration of Taiwan.
One of the main arguments offered by the CCP to defend their position of Taiwan
being a part of China is history. The CCP claims that historically Taiwan has been a part
of China and today is still a part of China. The CCP relies on the same argument to
justify its possession of Tibet and the province of Xinjiang. Both ofthese provinces, just
as Taiwan, have a complex history consisting of periods with independence, periods of
Chinese rule, and even periods of foreign rule. Similarly, today there are strong domestic
and international movements pushing for independence from Chinese rule in all three of
these areas. Hence, for the Chinese Government the status of Xinjiang and Tibet are
closely linked to the status of Taiwan. In the mind of the CCP maintaining governance
over these two provinces is essential to eventually achieving reunification with Taiwan.
As covered in Section 1, the independence movements in Xinjiang and Tibet are
both intimately related to religion-Islam in Xinjiang, Buddhism in Tibet. Consequently,
controlling and monitoring religion in these two areas is a priority for the CCP in order to
carry out its reunification policy with Taiwan.
War on Terror

The United States War on Terror began in 2001 has given the Chinese great
leverage in dealing with its separatist movements, particularly Muslim based movements
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in Xinjiang such as the ETIM. Since that time the Chinese government has changed its
rhetoric from addressing these groups as separatists to being terrorists. They have
claimed Uighur activists have ties with AI-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other internationally
recognized terrorists groups. Despite a lack of evidence for such ties, the Chinese have
used their leverage with the United States to get these groups officially recognized as
terrorist organizations. This has enabled the Chinese government to expand suppression
ofthese groups under the pretext of suppressing terrorism.
Political Restraints

Another highly relevant political factor influencing the Chinese government's
management of religious affairs is international trade and politics. China's economic
growth over the past several decades has turned it into the world's number one consumer
with a dire need for natural resources, especially oil. Since 1991 China has been a net
importer of oil. As more than 58% of China's oil imports are Middle Eastern and
primarily Muslim nations, China's access to oil supplies is contingent upon positive
relationships with its Muslim trading partners. 61 Mistreatment of their Muslim brethren
in China by the Chinese government could alienate these trading partners, and jeopardize
China's access to strategic oil supplies. Accordingly, China's treatment of Xinjiang and
its Muslim population has a large impact on its trading relationship with Muslim
countries.
At the same time, China's hands are not completely tied. The success of China's
textiles and manufacturing coupled with weapon sales in the Middle East also makes
these trading partners heavily reliant upon China. China's growing political power and
viability as an alternative investor and trading partner to the recently unpopular United
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States also boosts its leeway in the Middle East. Thus, the Chinese government is still
able to exert a tight hand of control over Xinjiang and its Muslim population, yet is
restrained from going too extreme.
The process of globalization over the past century has caused the economies of
almost every single nation to be intertwined. As the world's largest consumer and
exporter, China's economy is heavily reliant upon other nations. Maintaining good trade
relations with its main trading partners the United States, Europe, and Japan is a must.
The United States and Europe both possess large Christian popUlations who are very
concerned with the status of religious freedom in China. This economic relationship adds
political pressure to China not to take their controls on religion to too great of an extreme
as to anger their trading partners and invoke a negative impact on their trading
relationship.
In recent years China has gradually ascended the international stage and now
finds itself at the center of international spotlight as it prepares to host the 2008 Olympic
Games. In 2001 after 15 years of negotiations and preparations China joined the World
Trade Organization. Earlier that same year Beijing was selected to host the 2008
Olympics. Acquiring these two bids required several promises from the Chinese
Government to conform to international norms and improve its human rights record. The
past several months leading to the Olympics have brought about numerous protests
against the Chinese Government for its dealings with Tibet, Darfur, Burma, and human
rights in general. This international spotlight adds tremendous pressure to the Chinese
Government to ease controls over religion and improve ties with the largely Muslim
inhabited Xinjiang region and Tibetan Buddhist inhabited Tibet.
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Section 4
Conclusion
Putting it all together

Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam have all directly contributed to and
significantly influenced multiple rebellions against different Chinese governments
throughout history. These religious inspired rebellions have challenged, weakened, and in
some cases even overthrown almost every dynasty in China's long dynastic history. In
response Chinese Governments have become wary of religion, seeking to effectively
monitor and control it, with some regimes even unsuccessfully seeking to completely
banish religion. In tum, this has made religion even more resistant and self-willed, further
contributing to the unstable relationship between government and religion in China.
Accordingly, given such a history, over time religion has obtained a reputation
and an association with rebellion and disruption. This is especially true of Christianity,
mostly due to its connection with western imperialism during the most humiliating and
unstable period of Chinese history during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Buddhism has
escaped this association with rebellion, with the significant exception of Tibet.
Independence movements in this region are thoroughly linked with Tibetan Buddhism,
thus the Chinese Government also associates Tibetan Buddhism with rebellion and
disruption.
The case is rather similar for Islam. As with Buddhism, Islam is not viewed by
the CCP as a significant threat with the exception of its association with independence
movements. As the official religion of the minority people groups in Xinjiang province
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desiring independence from China, Islam too been linked to rebellion and disruption by
the Chinese Government.
This history of religious rebellion coupled with the role of religion in modem
independence movements gives the CCP ample reason to fear religion. This fear
combined with current political factors further reinforce the perceived need to control and
monitor religion. The CCP's political monopoly and desire to preserve this monopoly
factored in with its reunification aims with Taiwan and the subsequent importance of
defending its territorial borders both present strong motives for keeping religion
contained. The u.s. war against terrorism as well as China's economic might and
position at the heart of the global economy provide China with needed leverage for
carrying out such controls in the face of international criticism.
While in some ways further reinforcing the CCP's perceived need to control
religion, in other ways modem political factors serve to counteract Chinese Government
control over religion and pressure the government to ease such controls. The importance
of maintaining a good relationship with its trading partners, participating in global
organizations such as the WTO, and achieving a positive reputation in the global press all
pressure the Chinese Government to conform to international norms and standards.
Hosting the 2008 Summer Olympic Games has brought China into the spotlight of
international media coverage and is bringing unprecedented pressure to respect human
rights and ease controls on religion.

Comparison
The government's policies towards these three global religions contain many
similarities as well as discrepancies. Of course the official public policies towards each
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religion are the same. All three of these religions must be registered and approved by the
government in order to be considered permissible and protected by law. Once registered,
they are overseen by the government's Religious Affairs Bureau and organized into a
"Patriotic Organization" directly responsible for all of their affairs. Officials in the
Religious Affairs Bureau are given complete control over every aspect of the religious
activities of these religions. Their control extends into the conduction of religious
services, doctrinal beliefs held and taught, the publication and distribution of materials
for worship and training, and interaction with foreigners. While these overall official
policies are the same for every religion the actual application and enforcement differs
greatly with each religion.
A major divergence can be seen in the government's enforcement of policy
against unregistered religious activity. Unregistered activity by Buddhists is highly
tolerated and practically neglected by the Chinese government. Unregistered activity by
Christians, however, is highly sought out and persecuted in many regions (although
tolerated more so in others) of China. In major cities, particularly politically sensitive
locations such as Beijing and Shanghai, Christian "underground churches" or
unregistered meetings are actively hunted by the government and occasionally nationwide campaigns are conducted to crack down on unregistered meetings. Unregistered
Islamic meetings are also highly sought out by the CCP as they are suspected of being
affiliated with independence movements. Of course, the same goes for unregistered
Buddhist activities in Tibet as well.
A discrepancy in the enforcement of policy regulating religious interaction with
foreigners is also observable. In this aspect as well Christians are more heavily monitored
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than other religions. Foreign Christians are heavily discouraged from interacting with the
Chinese people and their involvement in registered churches is extremely restricted.
Funding from overseas Christians is also strongly discouraged by the government.
Buddhism in contrast is enthusiastically promoted by the government in international
relationships. Buddhist foreign exchanges, particularly with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and
Southeast Asian countries, are encouraged and used by the CCP to improve political ties
with its Asian neighbors. 62 Islam too is used by the Chinese Government to build
international bridges. Exchanges with Muslims from other nations are promoted as the
CCP attempts to use its Muslim population to help promote relations with Muslim
countries.
Once more, these favorable and relaxed policies towards Buddhism and Islam are
in general terms, to the exclusion of Tibet and Xinjiang. In these two regions interactions
with foreigners are tightly restricted and heavily scrutinized by the CCP. In fact, in these
two regions more extreme measures of monitoring interaction with foreigners are taken
by strict controls over foreign media access to the region and stringent restrictions on
foreign tourism in these two provinces.
Restrictions on printed religious material tell a similar story. Christian literature is
tightly controlled and great efforts are made by the CCP to ban and prevent the access to
and distribution of foreign Christian literature. Buddhist and Islamic literature are largely
left untouched except in Tibet and Xinjiang. In these two regions religious material is
screened and monitored with great care.
Government policy on the indoctrination of children tells a very unique story. In
this case Islam receives the greatest restrictions of the three religions. As Islam is
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characteristically a biological religion being passed on from parents to children as
opposed to through evangelization, the government seems to be rigorously banning the
indoctrination of children by Muslims in an attempt to reduce the population of Muslims
in Xinjiang (and thus reduce the population of those in favor of independence from
China). The indoctrination of children by Christians while also banned is unevenly
enforced. Some government churches allow and even encourage children to attend church
services, with some churches providing special services and weekly activities for
children. Other government churches strictly enforce the government's policy and do not
even allow children on church property. The indoctrination of children by Buddhists is a
non-issue given little to no attention by the government.
The role of the government in the appointment of religious leadership as well as
the government's interference with religious doctrine yet again demonstrate tight
government supervision of Christianity, Buddhism in Tibet, in addition to Islam in
Xinjiang. The government not only decides appointments to the Religious Affairs
Bureau, but actually makes leadership appointments at every level for Christianity even
down to the local church level. Appointments are often based on candidates' support for
the party and willingness to carry out party policy as opposed to making appointments
based on religious considerations.
Buddhists are given more freedom in choosing their own leadership outside of
Tibet. In Tibet the CCP is highly involved in the selection process of Buddhist leaders,
including the selection of Tibetan Buddhism's leadership-the Dalai and Panchen
Lamas. In Xinjiang the CCP actively interferes with the leadership selection process and
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works to ensure the appointment of non-radical leaders who oppose independence
movements and associations with radical foreign Muslim fundamentalist groups.
Aside from these official policies which are enforced in different manners with

each religion are the unofficial policies. Unofficially, Buddhism, again with the clear
exception of Tibetan Buddhism (which is intensely monitored by the government and
currently the greatest concern for the CCP), seems to be the most favored by the
government, very lightly monitored, given highly favorable treatment, and promoted as a
traditional Chinese religion.
Christianity on the other hand, is unofficially treated by the CCP as a major rival
and thus zealously attacked. The political nature of Christianity, its high level of
organization, its strong philosophy, and the loyalty which it commands are all highly
feared by the CCP. It appears to be portrayed by the government as a very "un-Chinese"
and politically motivated, dangerous religion. Of the three religions, when notconsidering the independence issues in Tibet and Xinjiang, Christianity is by far the most
closely monitored and persecuted by the Chinese Government.
Islam, much like Christianity is highly monitored by the Chinese Government. In
contrast to Christianity, however, the persecution ofIslam is based on its association with
independence movements in Xinjiang. This association with independence movements
has led to the enactment of extreme government scrutiny over Islam in Xinjiang province
and a whole campaign aimed at decreasing Islam's influence in the region. Aside from
concerns with the independence movements in Xinjiang, Islam seems to be portrayed as
an ethnic religion reserved for minority groups in China. It is seen as a tool by the
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Chinese government to improve relations with Islamic trading partners and especially to
secure much needed natural resources, namely oil.
Comparing the discrepancies in the Chinese Government's policies towards each
religion indicates that the policies differ based on the perceived threat from each religion
to the CCP and the perceived need to balance that threat. For instance, Buddhism is
normally not viewed as a challenge or any sort of threat to the CCP. Thus, policies
towards Buddhism are highly favorable and control mechanisms are very relaxed.
Conversely, when Buddhism becomes associated with independence movements in Tibet
and threatens the CCP's control over that region the policies become strikingly more
repressive. The same can be said of Islam which is normally not deemed as a threat to the
CCP. Yet, due to Islam's associations with threatening independence movements in
Xinjiang the CCP has governed Islam in this region with a heavy hand. Meanwhile,
Christianity is considered to be very threatening by the CCP and this fear is clearly
reflected by the strong enforcement of tight control and monitoring policies.
In conclusion, the interaction between religion and government in China is truly
unique and complex. The relationship of three global religions-Buddhism, Christianity,
and Islam-in this country with the Chinese Government are all very different. An
understanding of the history of the relationship between religion and government in
China combined with an understanding of the relevant political factors to this relationship
provide an explanation for the current state of affairs.
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